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1.1 Introduction
Environmental and genetic mutations can transform the cells in a co-operating
healthy tissue into an ecosystem of individualistic tumour cells that compete
for space and resources [1, 2, 3]. If we consider a tumour as an ecosystem it
is possible to utilise tools traditionally used by ecologists to study the evolu-
tion of a population in which there is some degree of phenotypical diversity.
One such tool is evolutionary game theory (EGT) which merges traditional
game theory with population biology [4]. It allows the prediction of successful
phenotypes and their adaptation to environmental selection forces. EGT is
considered as a promising tool in which to frame oncological problems [5] and
has been recently made more relevant by phenotypic studies of carcinogenesis
such as the ones by Hanahan, Weinberg and colleagues [6, 7].
Game theory (GT) was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern as
an instrument to study human behaviour [8, 9]. A game describes the inter-
actions of two or more players that follow two or more well defined strategies
in which the benefit of each player (payoff) results from these interactions
[10]. GT can be employed to study situations in which several players make
decisions in order to maximise their own benefit. GT was initially introduced
to model problems in economics, social and behavioural sciences and is used
as a formal way to analyse interactions between agents that behave strategi-
cally. Evolutionary game theory is the application of conventional GT as used
by economists and sociologists to study evolution and population ecology [4].
As opposed to conventional GT, in EGT the behaviour of the players is not
assumed to be based on rational payoff maximisation but it is thought to
have been shaped by trial and error - adaptation through natural selection or
individual learning [11]. In the context of the evolution of populations there
are two GT concepts that have to be interpreted in a different light. First,
a strategy is not a deliberate course of action but a phenotypic trait. The
payoff is Darwinian fitness, that is, average reproductive success. Secondly,
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the players are members of a population that compete or cooperate to obtain
a larger share of the population [4].
To illustrate some of the ideas in EGT let us consider the following example
named the Hawk-Dove game [11]. In this game we study an imaginary popu-
lation of individuals and a resource V which affects the reproductive success
of the individuals in this population. The population contains two phenotypes
that represent two different strategies to access the resource. When two indi-
viduals compete for the resource the outcome will depend on the phenotypic
strategies involved. The first phenotype, called Hawk in the game, always es-
calates the fight until injured (at a cost in fitness equal to C) or until the rival
retreats. The second phenotype, known as Dove in the game, will retreat if the
opponent escalates, that is, if the opponent seems determined to fight. The
interactions between the different phenotypes are shown in the payoff table
1.1.
Table 1.1. Payoff table for the change in fitness in the Hawk-Dove game.
Hawk Dove
Hawk V−C
2
0
Dove V V
2
Table 1.1 presents the interactions between the different phenotypes con-
sidered in the game. The table should be read following the columns such that
the payoff for a Hawk playing another Hawk is V−C2 expressing the fact that
they both have to share the resource and that they stand an equal chance
of getting injured. The payoff of a Hawk playing a Dove is V since the Dove
will withdraw from the competition. A Dove playing a Hawk gets no payoff
since it withdraws and when playing another Dove it will get the resource V
in half of the occasions. With this information it is possible to predict that
if the population is mainly composed of individuals with the Dove phenotype
then a Hawk individual will have a significant fitness advantage (as in most
of the interactions, the rivals are likely to be a Dove and thus retreat from
a full scale fight for the resource). On the other hand if the fitness cost of
injury is more than twice as high as the benefit provided by the contested
resource then a Dove would be quite successful in a population dominated by
Hawks (since a Hawk that interacts frequently with other Hawks is likely to
be eventually wounded and a Dove will always avoid costly wounds). Using
this example Maynard Smith introduced the concept of an evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS) [11]. An ESS is defined as a phenotype that, if adopted by the
vast majority of a population, will not be displaced by any other phenotype
that could appear in the population as a result of evolution [11]. Under this
definition the Dove phenotype cannot be an ESS and only under some specific
circumstances (when the fitness benefit of getting the resource outweighs the
fitness cost of an injury) would a Hawk phenotype be evolutionary stable.
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GT has been used to address many problems in biology in which different
species or phenotypes within one species compete. Examples of this are the
evolution of sex ratios [12], the emergence of animal communication [13] and
fighting behaviour and territoriality [11]. A recent focus on the capabilities
that cells acquire as tumours evolve [6] has shown how the interplay between
different phenotypes with different capabilities can lead to different evolution-
ary paths. This stresses the importance of GT as a modelling tool in cancer.
The most important capabilities which cells have to acquire in a neoplasm
that will become a malignant tumour are shown in figure 1.1. They include:
unlimited replicative potential, environmental independence for growth, eva-
sion of apoptosis, angiogenesis and invasion. The circumstances in which these
capabilities evolve and spread through the tumour population can be studied
using GT. Some of the most important milestones in the transformation of a
healthy tissue cells into malignant cancer such as tumourigenesis, angiogenesis
and invasion, have already been approached with GT.
Cell
58
Acquired GS autonomy was the first of the six capabili-
ties to be clearly defined by cancer researchers, in large
part because of the prevalence of dominant oncogenes
that have been found to modulate it. Three common
molecular strategies for achieving autonomy are evi-
dent, involving alteration of extracellular growth signals,
of transcellular transducers of those signals, or of intra-
cellular circuits that translate those signals into action.
While most soluble mitogenic growth factors (GFs) are
made by one cell type in order to stimulate proliferation
of another—the process of heterotypic signaling—many
cancer cells acquire the ability to synthesize GFs to
which they are responsive, creating a positive feedback
signaling loop often termed autocrine stimulation (Fedi
et al., 1997).Clearly, the manufacture of a GF by a cancer
cell obviates dependence on GFs from other cells within
the tissue. The production of PDGF (platelet-derived
growth factor) and TGF! (tumor growth factor !) by
glioblastomas and sarcomas, respectively, are two illus-
trative examples (Fedi et al., 1997).
The cell surface receptors that transduce growth-
stimulatory signals into the cell interior are themselves
targets of deregulation during tumor pathogenesis. GF
receptors, often carrying tyrosine kinase activities in
their cytoplasmic domains, are overexpressed in many
cancers. Receptor overexpression may enable the can-
cer cell to become hyperresponsive to ambient levelsFigure 1. Acquired Capabilities of Cancer
of GF that normally would not trigger proliferation (FediWe suggest that most if not all cancers have acquired the same set
et al., 1997). For example, the epidermal GF receptorof functional capabilities during their development, albeit through
various mechanistic strategies. (EGF-R/erbB) is upregulated in stomach, brain, and
breast tumors, while the HER2/neu receptor is overex-
pressed in stomach and mammary carcinomas (Slamon
et al., 1987; Yarden and Ullrich, 1988). Additionally, grossWe describe each capability in turn below, illustrate with
overexpression of GF receptors can elicit ligand-inde-a few examples its functional importance, and indicate
pendent signaling (DiFiore et al., 1987). Ligand-indepen-strategies by which it is acquired in human cancers.
dent signaling can also be achieved through structural
alteration of receptors; for example, truncated versions
Acquired Capability: Self-Sufficiency of the EGF receptor lacking much of its cytoplasmic
in Growth Signals domain fire constitutively (Fedi et al., 1997).
Normal cells require mitogenic growth signals (GS) be- Cancer cells can also switch the types of extracellular
fore they can move from a quiescent state into an active matrix receptors (integrins) they express, favoring ones
proliferative state. These signals are transmitted into the that transmit progrowth signals (Lukashev and Werb,
cell by transmembrane receptors that bind distinctive 1998; Giancotti and Ruoslahti, 1999). These bifunctional,
classes of signaling molecules: diffusible growth fac- heterodimeric cell surface receptors physically link cells
tors, extracellular matrix components, and cell-to-cell to extracellular superstructures known as the extracellu-
adhesion/interaction molecules. To our knowledge, no lar matrix (ECM). Successful binding to specific moieties
type of normal cell can proliferate in the absence of of the ECM enables the integrin receptors to transduce
such stimulatory signals. Many of the oncogenes in the signals into the cytoplasm that influence cell behavior,
cancer catalog act by mimicking normal growth signal- ranging from quiescence in normal tissue to motility,
ing in one way or another. resistance to apoptosis, and entrance into the active
Dependence on growth signaling is apparent when cell cycle. Conversely, the failure of integrins to forge
propagating normal cells in culture, which typically pro- these extracellular links can impair cell motility, induce
liferate only when supplied with appropriate diffusible apoptosis, or cause cell cycle arrest (Giancotti and Ru-
mitogenic factors and a proper substratum for their inte- oslahti, 1999). Both ligand-activated GF receptors and
grins. Such behavior contrasts strongly with that of tu- progrowth integrins engaged to extracellular matrix
mor cells, which invariably show a greatly reduced components can activate the SOS-Ras-Raf-MAP kinase
dependence on exogenous growth stimulation. The con- pathway (Aplin et al., 1998; Giancotti and Ruoslahti,
clusion is that tumor cells generate many of their own 1999).
growth signals, thereby reducing their dependence on The most complex mechanisms of acquired GS auton-
stimulation from their normal tissue microenvironment. omy derive from alterations in components of the down-
This liberation from dependence on exogenously de- stream cytoplasmic circuitry that receives and pro-
rived signals disrupts a critically important homeostatic cesses the signals emitted by ligand-activated GF
mechanism that normally operates to ensure a proper receptors and integrins. The SOS-Ras-Raf-MAPK cas-
cade plays a central role here. In about 25% of humanbehavior of the various cell types within a tissue.
Fig. 1.1. Acquired capabiliti s of cancer: Hanahan and Weinberg suggest that most
if not all cancers have acq ir d the same set of capabilities during thei evol tion.
These capabilities are: unlimited replicative potential, environmental independence
from anti growth signals, production of own growth signals, evasion of apoptosis,
angiogenesis and invasion (fro [6] with per ission).
The remaining of this chapter will provide, to the best of our kn wledge,
all the relevant examples of the applic tion of GT to the study of the somatic
cancer evolution and finally hint some of the possible future ve ues f this
method in the context of cancer research.
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1.2 Tumourigenesis
Tumour initiation requires the acquisition of a number of phenotypic capabili-
ties such as evasion of apoptosis and independence from environmental signals
(see figure 1.1). The evolution of these capabilities, normally acquired when
the tumour is still in the avascular stage, are studied in research by Tomlinson
and Bodmer [14, 15] and by Gatenby and Vincent [16].
1.2.1 Evasion of apoptosis
Problem. Apoptosis or programmed cell death is a mechanism that hinders
tumour progression. Cells with a working apoptotic machinery die when ge-
netic abnormalities are detected [6]. Thus cells in a malignant cancer have to
evolve mechanisms to disable the apoptotic machinery.
Model. Tomlinson and Bodmer [14] present a model in which three dif-
ferent apoptosis evasion related strategies are considered:
1. Cells that produce a paracrine growth factor to prevent apoptosis of neigh-
bouring cells.
2. Cells that produce an autocrine growth factor to prevent apoptosis of
themselves.
3. Cells susceptible to paracrine growth factors but incapable of production
of factors.
The aim of the model is to study the possibility of stable coexistence of
the different phenotypes (polymorphism) that could be possible in a tumour
when only these three phenotypes are considered.
Table 1.2. Payoff table for the game of programmed cell death. Parameter a rep-
resents the cost of producing a paracrine factor, b is the cost of the factor produced
in an autocrine fashion, c is the fitness benefit of evading apoptosis.
1 2 3
1 1− a + b 1 + b + c 1 + b
2 1− a 1 + c 1
3 1− a 1 + c 1
In table 1.2, a is the cost of producing the paracrine factor, b the benefit
of receiving the paracrine factor and c the benefit of producing the autocrine
factor.
Results. If a is positive then the third strategy displaces the first one
from the population. If only the other two strategies are considered then if the
benefit of the autocrine factor, provided by c, is positive the second strategy
will displace the third one. In most relevant situations the model shows a
strong selection for the autocrine factor producing phenotype and under the
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assumptions of the model the altruistic strategy (the first one) will always be
displaced.
Remarks. The model is very simple and easy to understand while at the
same time it captures the relevant features necessary to study the evolution of
the mechanisms to avoid apoptosis. However the authors do not explain the
mechanisms by which these phenotypes could appear in a tumour and what
would be the biological explanation of the costs and benefits of the different
growth factors.
1.2.2 Environmental poisoning
Problem. Tomlison introduced a further model in which he considers the
hypothesis that tumour cells might boost their own replicative potential at
the expense of other tumour cells by evolving the capability of producing
cytotoxic substances [15].
Model. Tomlinson speculates with different strategies that cells may
adopt to produce or cope with toxic factors. The main model aims to study
the polymorphic equilibria when cells can adopt one of the three following
strategies:
1. Cells producing cytotoxic substances against other cells,
2. cells producing resistance to external cytotoxic substances, and
3. cells producing neither cytotoxins nor resistance.
Table 1.3 shows the payoff table of the game with these phenotypes.
Table 1.3. Payoff table for the change in fitness for cells in a tumour in which the
base payoff is z, e the cost of producing the cytotoxin, f the fitness cost of being
affected by the cytotoxin, g the advantage of subjecting another cell to the cytotoin
and finally the cost of developing resistance to the cytotoxin is h.
1 2 3
1 z-e-f+g z-h z-f
2 z-e z-h z
3 z-e+g z-h z
Results. Game theoretical analysis and simulations show that production
of cytotoxic substances against other tumour cells can evolve in a tumour
population and that several cytotoxin related strategies may be present at a
given time (polymorphism).
Remarks. Although the author admits that there is little experimental
evidence for mutations that cause tumour cells to harm their neighbours, the
Warburg effect could fit nicely in the framework presented in this work. The
Warburg effect describes the switch of tumour cells from the conventional
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aerobic metabolism to the glycolytic metabolism. This metabolism is less ef-
ficient but produces, as a by-product, acid that can harm neighbouring cells
[17, 18, 19, 20]. Thus, in the game described by Tomlinson, e could correspond
to the fitness loss of the less efficient glycolytic metabolism, f could be the fit-
ness loss of a normal cell in an acid environment and g the fitness benefit
received by glycolytic cells that can take advantage of the harm done to their
non glycolytic neighbours.
1.3 Angiogenesis
Problem. A very important capability that has to be acquired by tumours on
the path to cancer is angiogenesis. Without access to the circulatory system
tumours do not grow to sizes bigger than 2mm in diameter [21]. Cells capable
of angiogenesis produce growth factors that promote the creation of new blood
vessels that can provide nutrients and oxygen to previously unreachable areas
in a growing tumour. Presumably the factors will be produced at a cost to
the tumour cell.
Model I. In their interpretation of an angiogenic game Tomlinson and
Bodmer [14] consider two strategies: cells denoted as A+ can produce an-
giogenic factors at a fitness cost i and cells denoted as A- that produce no
angiogenic factors. In any case cells will get a benefit j when there is an in-
teraction involving an angiogenic factor producing cell. The payoffs for the
interactions between these cells are shown in table 1.4.
Table 1.4. Payoff table for the change in fitness for a cell in a tumour with cells
capable of producing angiogenic factors (A+) and cells susceptible to benefit from
growth factors (A-).
A+ A-
A+ 1-i+j 1+j
A- 1-i +j 1
Results. The model shows that as long as the benefit j of angiogenesis
is greater than the cost i of producing angiogenic factors then both types of
strategies will be present in a tumour in proportion to these costs.
Remarks. This model of angiogenesis is rather simplistic but constitutes a
nice foundation for later models that take into account spatial considerations.
A more significant drawback is that the model does not attempt to suggest
a link between the different fitness costs and benefits and the underlying
biological mechanisms.
Model II. The first extension to this model was proposed by Bach et al
[22] suggesting a game with interactions between three players. In this game
the benefit j of angiogenesis is obtained only when at least two of the three
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players produce the angiogenic factor. The new payoff table is shown in table
1.5.
Table 1.5. Payoff table for the change in fitness for a cell in a tumour with cells
capable of producing angiogenic factors (A+) and cells susceptible to benefit from
growth factors (A-). In this version the interactions involve three players. The payoff
of a player is given by the columns (ie. the payoff of a A+ cell interacting with a
A+ and a A- cell is 1 - i + j but a A+ interacting with two A- cells is 1 - j).
A+ A-
A+, A+ 1-i+j 1+j
A+, A- 1-i +j 1
A-, A- 1-i 1
Results. The authors produce simulations using table 1.5 and show (see
figure 1.2) that this game yields results than differ from the original ones
introduced by Tomlinson and Bodmer. In this case even when the cost i is
smaller than the benefit j there are many scenarios for which the angiogenic
strategy will be displaced from the population. The existence of a polymorphic
equilibrium containing the angiogenic strategy depends, intuitively, on the
cost of producing angiogenic factors in comparison to the benefit they give
but also on the relative frequency of cells playing the angiogenic strategy in the
population. These results suggest that a gene therapy against the reparation
of tumour supressor genes would only need to change a fraction of the mutated
cells before the dynamics of the system drives them to extinction.
Model III. In a separate research Bach et al [23] studied how a spatial
version of the angiogenesis game could produce different results to those of
the original model by Tomlinson and Bodmer. In this game players inhabit a
100x100 lattice. Each player can follow either the angiogenic (A+) or the non-
angiogenic (A-) strategy. Time is discrete and in each time step a number of
cells is removed from the lattice at random. Neighbouring cells compete (using
table 1.4) to occupy unallocated space. The candidate cell that achieves the
highest score interacting with the neighbours determines the strategy that
will be followed by the new cell in the vacant slot (see figure 1.3).
Results. The authors found the results of the new formulation of the
model markedly different from those of the non-spatial counterpart. In spatial
models, space tends to favour growth promoters in ways that cannot be seen
in the non-spatial model. In any case polymorphic equilibria do exist and
in both spatial and non spatial cases the proportion of angiogenic players
increases as the benefits of angiogenesis increase or as the cost of producing
the growth factors decreases. The authors also conclude that, contrary to
other evolutionary models [24], space does not significantly favour co-operative
strategies in populations of cells.
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The frequency, vnþ1, of A+ cells in generation n+1 is
a function of the frequency vn in generation n, that is
!nþ1 ¼ f vnð Þ. The transfer function, F, can be shown to
be
!nþ1 ¼ fð!nÞ ¼
!% 1& 1& !ð Þ2! "% 1& iþ jð Þ þ 1& !ð Þ2% 1& ið Þ# $
!% ð1& 1& !ð Þ2% 1& iþ jð Þ þ 1& !ð Þ2% 1& ið Þ# $ þ 1& !ð Þ% !2 % 1þ jð Þ þ 1& !2ð Þ½ (
On the right-hand side, the index n has been sup-
pressed to simplify the notation.
3.3. Mathematical properties of the model
The mathematical behaviour of the transfer function
above depends on the relative values of i and j. When
j<2i all internal equilibria disappear and the frequency
of A+ cells goes to zero with increasing generation
number. Thus, the A+ property becomes extinct in the
population.
A special case is j=2i. This creates a single internal
point of equilibrium (v ¼ 1=2) which is attractive for v >
1=2 and repelling for v < 1=2.
If j>2i, a bifurcation occurs relative to the frequency
v ¼ 1=2: a stable equilibrium exists above v ¼ 1=2 and
an unstable equilibrium below v ¼ 1=2. The two internal
equilibria will change their positions symmetrically as a
function of the relationship between the cost and benefit
parameters. For j/i tending to infinity the two equilibria
tends toward frequencies of A+ cell going to 1 or 0.
Fig. 1 shows a simulation with j=3i. The frequency of
A+ cells converges towards the stable internal equili-
brium or towards zero depending on the initial relati e
frequency of these cells. The unstable equilibrium acts
as a barrier that has to be crossed, in order to change
the frequency of A+ cells away from either of the two
stable equilibria. The population will reach one of the
two equilibria depending on whether the initial fre-
quency of A+ cells is located above or below the
unstable equilibrium. In other words, starting above
the unstable equilibrium the population frequency
distribution will end up in a stable clonic hetero-
geneity (in population genetics termed a stable poly-
morphism).
4. Discussion
The most interesting feature of the current model is
the existence of an unstable internal equilibrium which
forms a barrier between two stable states of the popu-
lation, one with a stable polymorphism between A+
and A& cells and one where only A& cells are present.
During tumorigenesis, it must be assumed that local
collaboration is possible which may allow this critical
threshold to be crossed locally. At a later stage, the
selection pressure against the tumour cells may have
increased and this would leave the tumour in the state
described by the model analysed here. The model is
inspired by the possible effects of spatial heterogeneity,
although true spatial structured interactions are not
explored here. True spatial effects in a version of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game have been thoroughly inves-
tigated by Nowak and May [14,15], who showed that
spatial models with local effects, compared with pan-
mictic models, can generate qualitatively different
results in terms of coexistence or extinction of strategies.
In a therapeutic context, the model suggests the intri-
guing possibility that gene therapy directed against
restoration of tumour-suppressor genes only needs to
change the fraction of mutated tumour cells below a
certain level, and that once the frequency gets below the
unstable equilibrium, internal dynamics will force the
mutated cells to extinction. In cancer gene therapy, a
great deal of effort has gone into restoring normal p53
function in mutated tumour cells [16]. If immunohisto-
chemical detection of p53 is accepted as an indication of
mutations, hotspots of mutated cells have been descri-
bed [17]. Within thes regions, a varying frequency of
Table 2
Fitness matrix for the threshold model
Cell
Neighbours A+ A&
A+, A+ 1&i+j 1+j
A+, A& 1&i+j 1
A&, A& 1&i 1
Fig. 1. Simulation with parameters j=3i. The ordinate is the fre-
quency of A+ cells and the abscissa is the number of cell generations.
Note the extinction of A+ cells when their initial frequency is below
that of the internal unstable equilibrium.
2118 L.A. Bach et al. / European Journal of Cancer 37 (2001) 2116–2120
Fig. 1.2. Simulations of the threshold model in which the b nefit of angiogenesis (j)
is three times the cost of producing the growth factors (i). The plot shows the results
of three simulations with a different of A+/A- players in the starting population.
The ordinate is the frequency of A+ cells and the abscissa is the number of cell
generations. (from [22] with permission )
independently of th co ts and benefits to the growth
promoting cells. This gives payoff Table IIa.
We can now use the payoff Table II, that relates
parameters b, c, d and e o S (the C–D nteraction) and T
(the D–C int ract on), to determine for the wellmixed
case the resultant prop rtions of growth promoters and
non-promoters. We see that wh n the b nefit to a non-
promoter from the chemical compound is greater than the
total benefit minus the cost to the growth promoter, i.e.
d . bþ e2 c; and the benefit to the growth p omoter
outweighs the cost it pays, i.e. b . c we have a Hawk–
Dove game (i.e. T . 1 and 0 , S , 1). The repli ator
equation for proport on of grow h promoting cells is then
xtþ1 ¼ ð12 cþ bþ extÞxtð12 cþ bþ extÞxt þ ð1þ dxtÞð12 xtÞ : ð3Þ
The equilibrium proportion of growth promoters in the
case where b . c and d . bþ e2 c is
x% ¼ ðb2 cÞ=ðd 2 eÞ: ð4Þ
It appears, t eref re, that the additi nal benefit, e does
not change the genera conclusion that the production of
costly angiogenic factors is selected for amongst the cells.
Howeve , the equilibrium number of growth promoting
cells is increased as the extra benefit increases (Maynard-
Smith, 1982).
Other models of cell interacti ns re encompassed by
the model in Table II. For ex mple, Tomlinson and
Bodmer (1997) also co sider comp tition between cells
which produce a factor to prevent programmed cell death
in a purely paracrine fashion (i.e. no effect on producer)
against cells which produce growth factor in a purely
autocrine fashion (i.e. benefit to self but not to
neighbours). By defining b2 c , 0 the autocrine strategy
now represents a purely “altruistic” act on the part of the
growth promoter, as d and e remain constant. We see that
T . 1 but S , 0; giving the well-known Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Here, the interesting result is that
although these “altruistic” cells would thrive in a pure
population of growth promoters, in the well-mixed case,
an invading non-promoting cell would reproduce and take
over the entire population. This is seen by finding an
equilibrium for the replicator equation (3) when c . b:
In this case, the proportion of growth promoting cells is
x% ¼ 0 corresponding to the defecting or non-pr moting
strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1988).
SPATIAL EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODELS
Spatial patterns undoubtedly arise in the growth of
cancerous tumours, for the simple reason that offspring
cells grow adjacent to the parent cell. It is important,
therefore, that spatial effects are accounted for when
attempting to determine the growth and changing
genotypic compositi n of tumours. Indeed, the fact that
the Prisoner’s Dilemma naturally r ses out of cell
interactions points o the intriguing possibility that spatial
arrangements of cells m y low for truly altruistic ef ects
on proliferation. That is, we may see the evolutio of
purely paracrine cells. The results of Nowak and May
(1992) and others s ow that true altruism can arise in the
Prisoner’s Di emm when pl yers are arranged in a two
dimensional array (Nowak and May, 1992; Nakamuru
et al., 1997). Hauert (2001; 2002) has recently presented
an exten ive s udy of ral two-player S–T sp tial
games with nearest neighbou inte action . He has shown
that for many games, space has an important role in
de ermining the equilibrium proportio of defectors and
co-operators. In general, discrepancies are almost always
found between r sults from the mean-field replicator
equation and nearest nei hbour inte action models.
We ow propose a variety of simple two dimensional
lattice simulation models to det rmine the behaviour of
s ch cell interaction dynamics (Wolfram, 1984; Nowak
d May, 1992). Each simulation model begins with a
100 £ 100 array of cells, a proportion of which are growth
promoting (C strategy) and some of which are non-
promoting (D strategy). The basic protocol for updating
the cells on each generation is as follows: First, a certain
number of cells will be removed from the lattice (the
number depends on whether updating is synchronous,
semi-synchronous or asynchronous, see below for
details). The neighbours of the removed cells will then
compete to occupy the empty cells. Each non-empty
neighbour to the empty cell will perform a two-player
interaction with each of its neighbours and hence receive a
payoff. The payoff to reach interaction is determined
according to the specified payoff matrix (in our case we
use payoff Tables I and II). The obtained payoffs from
each interaction are summed to yield the neighbour cell’s
total payoff or fitness, which in turn is used in order to
determine which of the candidate neighbour cells will be
selected to reproduce (the reproduction may be determi-
nistic where the cell with the highest fitness reproduces or
probabilistic where reproduction is proportional to fitness,
again see below for details). The “winning” neighbour
cell is subsequently copied into the empty site. Hence, an
empty site alway becomes e-occupied by the prolifer-
ation of the cell which wins a local competition. Figure 1
gives a diagrammatic representation of the update scheme
for a single removed cell.
FIGURE 1 A diagrammatic representation of the cell update process.
First a cell is selected to be removed (in this case the Cmarked in bold in
the configuration on the left). Then the four neighbouring cells all assess
their fitness (middle configuration). The cell with the highest fitness then
reproduces into the empty space (configuration on the right).
L.A. BACH et al.50
Fig. 1.3. A diagrammatic representation of the cell update process in the spatial
model of the angiogenesis game by Bach and colleagues [23]. First a cell is selected
to be removed (in this case the C marked in bold in the configuration on the left).
Then the four neighbouring cells all assess their fitness (middle configuration). The
cell with the highest fitness then reproduces into the empty space (right). (from [23]
with permission)
1.4 Motility/invasion
A tumour in which cells develop the capability of invading other tissues be-
comes a malignant tumour and thus significantly worsens the prognosis of a
patient. EGT is a tool that could greatly improve our understanding of the
circumstances that influence the successful evolution of invasive phenotypes.
Model I. Mansury and colleagues have recently introduced a rather un-
conventional EGT formulation that they used on top of a previous cellular
automaton model in the context of brain tumours [25, 26]. This GT module
allows the original model to deal with cell-cell interactions in a tumour consist-
ing of cells with different phenotypes. The model was designed to investigate
the genotype to phenotype link in a polymorphic tumour cell population.
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This model covers two distinct strategies. Strategy P is characterised by a
highly proliferative genotype and a high number of gap junctions. Strategy
M is characterised by a highly migratory phenotype and a low number of
gap junctions (which are used for cell to cell communication). As opposed to
other game theoretical models in which a payoff table determines the fitness
change of players when they interact, in this model three tables are used not
to compute fitness change but to encode the rules of the cellular automata.
The tables are shown in tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8.
Table 1.6. Payoff table that describes the rate of change in cell to cell commu-
nication skills depending on the phenotype of the interacting cell in the model by
Mansury et al. [26].
P M
P ↑↑↑ ↑↑
M ↑↑ ↑
Table 1.7. Payoff table that describes how the proliferation capability of a cell
is influenced by its interaction with cells with other phenotypes (proliferative or
motile) in the model by Mansury et al. [26].
P M
P ↓↓↓ ↓↓
M ↓↓ ↓
Table 1.8. Payoff table that describes how the motility of a cell with a given
phenotype changes depending on what other cells the cell is interacting with. Model
by Mansury et al. [26].
P M
P ↑ ↑↑
M ↑↑ ↑↑↑
Table 1.6 shows how the cell to cell communication capabilities change
according to the strategies followed by the interacting cells. Since the authors
assume that there is a negative correlation between the extent of communi-
cation and proliferation then the proliferative capability of a cell with the
proliferative strategy P will be lower if it interacts with another cell with the
same strategy. On the other hand it will be higher if it interacts with a cell
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with the motile strategy M. Table 1.7 shows that cells will have a higher pro-
liferative potential when they interact with cells that have the motile strategy.
Table 1.8 shows that interacting with cells with the motile strategy will also
increase the probability of motility of the interacting cell. These tables are
used to guide the behaviour of the cells on a 500x500 lattice containing ini-
tially 5 cells of each type and two unequal sources of nutrients in two different
locations. In each time step the interactions of a cell with its neighbours are
used to adjust the probabilities of proliferation and motility.
Results.The authors used this model to study how varying the payoffs for
A-A interactions affects a number of features of the tumour such as the speed
(see figure 1.4) at which it reaches the nutrient sources or the fractality of the
resulting spatial patterns.
nutrient levels are lower yet sufficiently high to
migrate: fLof‘ofU , and (ii) there is at least one
unoccupied, adjacent location for the cell to invade
that is one lattice site away. If these criteria are met,
then an eligible tumor cell migrates and follows the
direction of the strongest signal, Sk, as defined in
Eq. (7).
(v) Determine cell quiescence. Cells that do not pro-
liferate or migrate automatically enter a reversible,
quiescent state.
5. Results
In the following, we show results from varying the
payoffs for A–A cell–cell interactions in terms of their
phenotypic p oliferative a tivities (see Table 4). Recall
from our modeling section that interactions between a
pair of A–A cells result in the steepest reduction of the
proliferation activity for both cells involved. We have
also experimented with various migration payoffs for
B–B interactions, yet as expected we did not find a
discernible pattern n heir spatio-temporal performance
due to our current setup of equal time-scale for both
proliferation and migration, which implies that during
either proliferation or migration, the tumor expands to a
vacant lattice site that is one unit of distance away from
the parent’s location fo the former or the migrating
cell’s original location for the latter.
5.1. Average velocity
Here, average velocity serves as a measure for the
tumor’s overall performance. Fig. 1 shows that as on the
x-axis the payoffs conferred to A–A interaction increase
in terms of lesser reduction of Type A’s proliferative
activities, unexpectedly the average velocity of the
tumor’s spatial expansion exhibits a phase transition.
T at is, initially the time to the second nutrient source
rises, representing declining velocity, as the A–A payoffs
increase. But then it appears to reach a minimum
velocity at a payoff of approximately 0.83 before it rises
again, as Type A cells become the numerically dominat-
ing genotype (see the right y-axis in Fig. 2) in the total
population (i.e. including proliferating, migrating, and
quiescent cancer cells) at a payoff of 1.00.
5.2. Structural patterns and genotypic robustness
Fig. 2 shows that as the payoffs conferred to A–A
cell–cell interaction increase, surface roughness declines
continuously (left y-axis). At the same time, the
frequency of genotype A (right y-axis) in the total
population increases monotonically, i.e. becomes more
robust. That is, as the more proliferative yet less
migratory Type A becomes dominant, surface roughness
declines. Conversely, surface roughness rises as the more
migratory Type B becomes the dominating genotype (at
lower A–A payoffs), consistent with our previous study
examining ‘structural–pattern’ relationship (Mansury
and Deisboeck, 2004) showing a positive correlation
between fractal dimensions of the tumor surface and the
number of migrating cells.
5.3. Time series and spatial profile of tumor genotypes
To better understand the evolution of the tumor
cells over time, here we examine the time series of
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Fig. 1.4. Plot of t e time to reach a nutrient source (i.e. the inverse of the tumour’s
average velocity) versus various payoff values conferred to P-P intercellular interac-
tions (where A is the label for the pr liferative phenotype in the paper). The error
bars indicate the standard deviations from performing 10 Monte Carlo simulations
for each value of payoffs for P-P interactions. (from [26] with permission).
Remarks. Although the model is interesting it is not as simple as other
models reviewed in this chapter. A significant drawback is that the model is
not evolutionary in the sense that it does not take into account the possibility
of mutations introducing new phenotypes or tumour cells producing offspring
different from their progenitors. This has been identified by the authors as
something to be addressed in a future version of the model although they
still claim the model to be based on EGT. Moreover, the authors do not take
advantage of the tools provided by GT analysis to study the different steady
state situations that could arise for different values of the payoff tables. This
is probably due to the fact that the model is not a conventional GT model
and the conventional game theoretical tools would not be easy to use in this
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context. Also, the model provides a view on the dynamics of the tumour
growth that is rarely found in most other game theory analysis whose focus
is on the study of equilibria.
Model II. The emergence of invasive phenotypes is influenced not only by
its interaction with one phenotype or the other but by the complex interplay
of several phenotypes which, in many cases has an indirect effect. Basanta et
al. [27] hypothesise a number of scenarios in which three types of phenotypes
interact in games with two and three players. They place these phenotypes in
the context of an evolutionary non-spatial game theoretical model to test the
hypothesis by Gatenby and colleagues that tumour invasion is promoted by
the emergence of cells with a glycolytic metabolism [20]. The model represents
a glioma tumour populated by cells with enhanced proliferative capabilities,
known as autonomous growth cells (AG), which can mutate into cells whose
phenotype can make then follow either a more motile strategy (INV) or the
glycolytic metabolism strategy (GLY).
Table 1.9. Payoff table that represents the change in fitness of a tumour cell with
a given phenotype interacting with another cell. Three different strategies are con-
sidered, those with higher replicative potential (AG), enhanced motility (INV) and
glycolytic metabolism (GLY). The base payoff in a given interaction is equal to 1
and the cost of moving to another location with respect to the base payoff is c. The
fitness cost of acidity is n and k is the fitness cost of having a less efficient glycolytic
metabolism. The table should be read following the columns, thus the fitness change
for an INV cell interacting with an AG would be 1− c.
AG INV GLY
AG 1
2
1− c 1
2
+ n− k
INV 1 1− c
2
1− k
GLY 1
2
− n 1− c 1
2
− k
Results. Table 1.9 defines the interactions between the three phenotypes.
The authors investigate a number of scenarios in which subgames based on
two strategies are used to study how one phenotype could emerge in a tumour
populated by cells that use a different strategy. The results show that cells
with a higher replicative potential (AG) and invasive cells (INV) can coexist
in a tumour as long as the fitness cost of motility is not too high. They
also reveal that autonomous growth (AG) cells cannot coexist with glycolytic
(GLY) cells. An interesting result of the model when all three strategies are
considered simultaneously is that the appearance of the invasive phenotype
is facilitated by the existence of glycolytic cells. Figure 1.6 shows how the
proportion of invasive cells (X axis) increases as the cost of having a glycolytic
metabolism (k) decreases and the cost of living in an acid environment (n)
increases. In other words, the success of the invasive phenotype depends on the
same factors that determine the fate of the glycolytic phenotype. The model
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suggests that any therapy that could increase the fitness cost of tumour cells
switching to a glycolytic metabolism or the susceptibility of normal cells to
acid environments might decrease the probability of the emergence of more
invasive phenotypes.
Fig. 1.5. Proportion of invasive cells in a tumour with three phenotypes (au-
tonomous growth, invasive and glycolytic). k is the cost in terms of fitness of adopting
the glycolytic metabolism whereas n is the fitness cost of a normal cell when staying
with a glycolytic cell.
1.5 Outlook
The examples described in this chapter treat tumour populations as ecosys-
tems of potentially co-operating and/or competing cells. In these ecosystems,
the success of one phenotype depends on its interactions with other existing
phenotypes. Such an approach has been shown to be a helpful and useful
way to study cancer evolution. Most of the applications use GT to study the
steady state of a population of tumour cells that follow different strategies
dictated by their phenotypes, acquired as a result of genetic and epigenetic
mutations. This can be very relevant to study the different ways in which
a tumour population may evolve under different model parameters and as-
sumptions of their interplay. Such studies could lead to cancer therapies that
would alter the dynamics of cancer evolution towards benign tumours. One
limitation of EGT/GT is that all relevant potential phenotypes/strategies
have to be known a priori if a good understanding of cancer evolution is to
be obtained. Knowing all the potential relevant phenotypes might be difficult
and even if the phenotypes and their interactions are well known the EGT
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model might be too complicated to be analysed. Moreover, with more strate-
gies/phenotypes the composition of the population may not converge to an
equilibrium and the frequencies of the phenotypes could keep oscillating in a
regular or chaotic fashion [4].
One more limitation of the GT models shown in this chapter is that they
do not study the dynamics in a tumour population (dynamics which may or
may not lead to an equilibrium). GT models that make use of population
biology have the potential to overcome this limitation and also ease the con-
nection between a quantitative model and experimental data as the payoff
tables used in more conventional EGT models tend to make the assumption
that the fitness values are independent of space or time. One promising venue
is to couple conventional GT with population dynamics which is also based on
the assumption that successful strategies spread [28, 4]. This trend is shown
in the work of Gatenby and Vincent [16] whose EGT model uses methods
from population biology in order to study how the phenotypes of cells in a
population evolve towards ESS. Gatenby and Vincent adopted a game the-
ory approach influenced by population dynamics to study the influence of the
tumour-host interface in colorectal carcinogenesis. The authors formulated an
extended system of Lotka-Volterra equations to model the effect of nutrients
and sensitivity to growth constraints in the proliferation of tumour cells. The
cells in the tumour population are characterised by the number of substrate
transporters (a higher number of them allow more nutrients in the cell) on the
cell surface and by the cell response to normal growth constraints. Initially
all the tumour cells are assumed to have normal values for both parameters
but these values are allowed to change and the authors study their evolu-
tion. Their work demonstrates that normal cells in a multicellular organism
occupy a ridge-shaped maximum of the fitness landscape that allows the het-
erogeneous coexistance of multiple cells. This fact makes them susceptible to
mutations that are fitter and thus allow the somatic evolution that charac-
terises cancer. The authors also conclude that any therapy that reduces the
population density would be counterproductive since it would allow the more
aggressive phenotypes to grow. Subsequent research uses the same formula-
tion to study other stages of tumour progression like invasion and metastasis
[29, 30].
GT is also a suitable tool to frame cooperative effects. Evolution of co-
operation is a sub-field of GT pioneered by Robert Axelrod [31]. Researchers
in this field study the circumstances under which selfish agents will spon-
taneously co-operate. An example of how evolution of cooperation could be
used to study cancer evolution was provided by Axelrod and collaborators
in a recent paper [32] in which they show how tumour cells can cooperate
sharing skills and capabilities (such as the production of angiogenic factors or
paracrine growth factors needed to escape the homeostatic regulation of the
tissue).
Evolutionary game theory has a relatively short history in the field of
theoretical oncology but with an increasingly better understanding of the role
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fitness of any cell using a specific strategy is determined by the point on the
landscape corresponding to the two components of the strategy vector. A
possible initial state for a pluripotent normal cell is indicated by the dot. This
strategy corresponds to evolutionary equilibrium for normal cells and remains
a maximum point for every snapshot as the landscape changes shape under-
neath it. Because of the interactive, nonlinear dynamics, the characteristics of
the growing cell population alter the adaptive landscape. In the case of normal
tissue, the differentiated cell populations ultimately find themselves at a point
on a ridge-shaped maximum.
Interestingly, this novel configuration allows stable coexistence of multiple
cellular “species” defined by the same G-function but with different “strate-
gies” along the edge of the ridge. These results provide a simple, general
control mechanism for simultaneous direction of pluripotent stem cells into a
population with a specific differentiated phenotype and maintenance of a
society of stable, noncompeting cellular populations in functioning tissue, a
necessary condition for formation of multicellular organisms. This general
mechanism is supported by experimental data demonstrating that differentia-
tion in embryogenesis and tissue repair is controlled by signals from the
microenvironment (18–21).
Note the orientation of the ridge in nonequilibrium tissue (at t ! 0) along
the v2 axis, which defines the cellular interaction with normal environmental
proliferation constraints. This indicates that coexistent, noncompeting popula-
tions must possess different strategies defined by these normal tissue controls
(i.e., proliferation constraints by different combinations of oncogenes and
tumor suppressor genes). That is, organization of function in developing or
remodeling normal tissue (i.e., tissue not at a stable steady state) requires
neighboring cells to possess different sets of growth control parameters (i.e.,
different “strategies”). The requirement for distinctly different growth control
strategies in coexisting cellular populations provides a potential explanation
for the large number of oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes found in the
human genome and the diversity of their mutations found among cancers of
different cell types.
It appears that invasive cancer is the “price” of the fitness landscape that
allows formation of multicellular organisms. Because normal cells do not
achieve a proper maximum at equilibrium, there is an opportunity for tissue
invasion by mutant cellular phenotypes. As long as the mutants are derived by
the same G-function, they do not change the shape of the adaptive landscape,
and they will simply coexist at low numbers. However, if a mutant should have
a different G-function, the situation is quite different (22). In fact, because the
system dynamics are highly nonlinear, the introduction of a mutant population
initially at a higher fitness, as discussed below, can deform the adaptive
landscape such that normal cells now occupy a local minimum. This situation
is illustrated in Fig. 2, where it is shown how the presence of a tumor cell
deforms the normal cell adaptive landscape so that, at equilibrium, the normal
cells are at a local minimum on the adaptive landscape. The tumor cells are
introduced in small numbers (x2 ! 10 at t ! 0) and grow to x2 ! 218 at
equilibrium. Because neither the normal or tumor cells are allowed to evolve,
the tumor remains at a this equilibrium value and does not affect the number
of normal cells. However, because the normal cells are now at a minimum, the
stability of normal tissue requires proliferative controls that are both redundant
(i.e., several oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes) and robust (i.e., mainte-
nance of a sufficiently low basal rate of cellular mutations to prevent signif-
icant cellular evolution during the reproductive life of the organism).
We have seen that normal tissue may be invaded if the mutant population
can change the adaptive landscape in a detrimental way (to normal cells). We
will now show that if the mutant cells can evolve (toward a peak on the mutant
adaptive landscape), the combined effect allows for the mutant type to replace
the normal cells. We propose the transition of cellular populations from their
normal configuration on the adaptive landscape to one that promotes emer-
gence of a mutant phenotype constitutes the somatic evolution of an invasive
cancer.
Evolution of Invasive Cancer. The model demonstrates that the evolu-
tionary steps of invasive cancer take place at bifurcations in the system
dynamics that result in a change of the equilibrium state. We now examine this
process using the evolution of colorectal cancer as a specific example. Because
we find that each normal cell population must be controlled by different sets
of oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes, favored mutations in specific
genetic loci will vary from one cell type to another. In colorectal carcinogen-
esis these targets appear to include, among others, the APC and K-RAS genes
(3, 23, 24). The former is a multifunctional gene that acts as a tumor suppressor
through down-regulation of !-catenin, which is a transcription activator (25)
found at intercellular junctions (from which it transits to the nucleus), sug-
gesting a role in transmitting information regarding contact with neighboring
cells and other aspects of the microenvironment. The majority of K-RAS
mutations are gain-of-function missense leading to increasing growth stimu-
latory signals, although they also affect cell adhesion, cell cycle, and cell
metabolism (26).
Thus, K-RAS or APC mutations will diminish environmental control of
proliferation in the tumor cells through increased translation of growth pro-
moter signals and decreased inhibition from cell-cell contact (27). This is
incorporated into the model by increasing the mean tissue carrying capacity of
tumor cells.
With a normal background mutation rate of about 2 " 10#7 mutations/
gene/cell division (28), "n ! "t ! 0.0001. Mutations in u will be very close
to the mean value, resulting in a very small rate of evolution. This is accounted
for in the figures by setting SD of mutations among the normal and tumor cells
to a small value. In generating Fig. 2, all parameter values for the normal cells
are the same as those used in Fig. 1, and all parameter values for the tumor
Fig. 1. Upon reaching equilibrium, normal cells actually sit on ridge-shaped maximum
in the in vivo adaptive landscape. This provides a tissue structure that allows coexistence
of multiple distinct but noncompeting populations along the length of the ridge, a
necessary condition for formation of multicellular organisms.
Fig. 2. The presence of tumor cells deforms the tissue adaptive landscape over time so
that normal cells arrive at a local minimum and are then readily subject to invasion by the
mutant phenotypes.
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fitness of any cell using a specific strategy is determined by the point on the
landscape corresponding to the two components of the strategy vector. A
possible initial state for a pluripotent normal cell is indicated by the dot. This
strategy corresponds to evolutionary equilibrium for normal cells and remains
a maximum point for every snapshot as the landscape changes shape under-
neath it. Because of the interactive, nonlinear dynamics, the characteristics of
the growing cell population alter the adaptive landscape. In the case of normal
tissue, the differentiated cell populations ultimately find themselves at a point
on a ridge-shaped maximum.
Interestingly, this novel configuration allows stable coexistence of multiple
cellular “species” defined by the same G-function but with different “strate-
gies” along the edge of the ridge. These results provide a simple, general
control mechanism for simultaneous direction of pluripotent stem cells into a
population with a specific differentiated phenotype and maintenance of a
society of stable, noncompeting cellular populations in functioning tissue, a
necessary condition for formation of multicellular organisms. This general
mechanism is supported by experimental data demonstrating that differentia-
tion in embryogenesis and tissue repair is controlled by signals from the
microenvironment (18–21).
Note the orientation of the ridge in nonequilibrium tissue (at t ! 0) along
the v2 axis, which defines the cellular interaction with normal environmental
proliferation constraints. This indicates that coexistent, noncompeting popula-
tions must possess different strategies defined by these normal tissue controls
(i.e., proliferation constraints by different combinations of oncogenes and
tumor suppressor genes). That is, organization of function in developing or
remodeling normal tissue (i.e., tissue not at a stable steady state) requires
neighboring cells to possess different sets of growth control parameters (i.e.,
different “strategies”). The requirement for distinctly different growth control
strategies in coexisting cellular populations provides a potential explanation
for the large number of oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes found in the
human genome and the diversity of their mutations found among cancers of
different cell types.
It appears that invasive cancer is the “price” of the fitness landscape that
allows formation of multicellular organisms. Because normal cells do not
achieve a proper maximum at equilibrium, there is an opportunity for tissue
invasion by mutant cellular phenotypes. As long as the mutants are derived by
the same G-function, they do not change the shape of the adaptive landscape,
and they will simply coexist at low numbers. However, if a mutant should have
a different G-function, the situation is quite different (22). In fact, because the
system dynamics are highly nonlinear, the introduction of a mutant population
initially at a higher fitness, as discussed below, can deform the adaptive
landscape such that normal cells now occupy a local minimum. This situation
is illustrated in Fig. 2, where it is shown how the presence of a tumor cell
deforms the normal cell adaptive landscape so that, at equilibrium, the normal
cells are at a local minimum on the adaptive landscape. The tumor cells are
introduced in small numbers (x2 ! 10 at t ! 0) and grow to x2 ! 218 at
equilibrium. Because neither the normal or tumor cells are allowed to evolve,
the tumor remains at a this equilibrium value and does not affect the number
of normal cells. However, because the normal cells are now at a minimum, the
stability of normal tissue requires proliferative controls that are both redundant
(i.e., several oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes) and robust (i.e., mainte-
nance of a sufficiently low basal rate of cellular mutations to prevent signif-
icant cellular evolution during the reproductive life of the organism).
We have seen that normal tissue may be invaded if the mutant population
can change the adaptive landscape in a detrimental way (to normal cells). We
will now show that if the mutant cells can evolve (toward a peak on the mutant
adaptive landscape), the combined effect allows for the mutant type to replace
the normal cells. We propose the transition of cellular populations from their
normal configuration on the adaptive landscape to one that promotes emer-
gence of a mutant phenotype constitutes the somatic evolution of an invasive
cancer.
Evolution of Invasive Cancer. The model demonstrates that the evolu-
tionary steps of invasive cancer take place at bifurcations in the system
dynamics that result in a change of the equilibrium state. We now examine this
process using the evolution of colorectal cancer as a specific example. Because
we find that each normal cell population must be controlled by different sets
of oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes, favored mutations in specific
genetic loci will vary from one cell type to another. In colorectal carcinogen-
esis these targets appear to include, among others, the APC and K-RAS genes
(3, 23, 24). The former is a multifunctional gene that acts as a tumor suppressor
through down-regulation of !-catenin, which is a transcription activator (25)
found at intercellular junctions (from which it transits to the nucleus), sug-
gesting a role in transmitting information regarding contact with neighboring
cells and other aspects of the microenvironment. The majority of K-RAS
mutations are gain-of-function missense leading to increasing growth stimu-
latory signals, although they also affect cell adhesion, cell cycle, and cell
metabolism (26).
Thus, K-RAS or APC mutations will diminish environmental control of
proliferation in the tumor cells through increased translation of growth pro-
moter signals and decreased inhibition from cell-cell contact (27). This is
incorporated into the model by increasing the mean tissue carrying capacity of
tumor cells.
With a normal background mutation rate of about 2 " 10#7 mutations/
gene/cell division (28), "n ! "t ! 0.0001. Mutations in u will be very close
to the mean value, resulting in a very small rate of evolution. This is accounted
for in the figures by setting SD of mutations among the normal and tumor cells
to a small value. In generating Fig. 2, all parameter values for the normal cells
are the same as those used in Fig. 1, and all parameter values for the tumor
Fig. 1. Upon reaching equilibrium, normal cells actually sit on ridge-shaped maximum
in the in vivo adaptive landscape. This provides a tissue structure that allows coexistence
of multiple distinct but noncompeting populations along the length of the ridge, a
necessary condition for formation of multicellular organisms.
Fig. 2. The presence of tumor cells deforms the tissue adaptive landscape over time so
that normal cells arrive at a local minimum and are then readily subject to invasion by the
mutant phenotypes.
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Fig. 1.6. (a) Upon reaching equilibrium, normal cells sit on the ridge-shaped maxi-
mum in the in vivo adaptive landscape. This provides a tissue structure that allows
coexistenc of multiple distinc noncompeting populations, a necessary condition for
the formation of multicellular organisms. (b) The presence of tumour cells deforms
the tissue adaptive la dscape over time so th t ormal cells ar ive at a local mini-
mum and are then readly sunject to invasion by the mutant p enotypes (from [16]
with permission).
of the icroenvironment in tumour evolution [33] and with the recent interest
in studying cancer from ecological [2, 3] and phenotypic [6] viewpoints, the
role of this tool to understand the interactions between all the relevant agents
within a tumour and their role driving cancer evolution will surely rise.
Acknowledg ments
We uld like to acknowledge the help and suggestions from our colleagues
at TU Dresden: Lutz Brusch, Haralambos Hatzikirou and Michael Ku¨cken.
The work in this paper was support d in part by funds from the EU Marie
Curie Network ”Modeling, Ma hematical Methods and Computer Simulation
of Tumour Growth and Therapy” (EU-RTD-IST-2001-38923). We also ac-
knowledge the support provided by the systems biology network HepatoSys
of the German Ministry for Education and Research through grant 0313082C.
Andreas Deutsch is a member of the DFG-Center for Regenerative Therapies
Dresden - Cluster of Excellence - and gratefully acknowledges support by the
Center.
References
1. P.C. Nowell. The clonal evolution of tumor cell populations. Science, 4260,
194:23–28, 1976.
1 A game theoretical perspective on the somatic evolution of cancer 15
2. B. Crespi and K. Summers. Evolutionar biology of cancer. Tr. Ecol. Evol.,
20(10):545–52, Oct. 2005.
3. L. Merlo, J. Pepper, B. Reid, and C. Maley. Cancer as an evolutionary and
ecological process. Nat. Rev. Cancer, 6:924–935, December 2006.
4. K. Sigmund and M. Nowak. Evolutionary game theory. Curr. Biol., 9:503–5,
1999.
5. R. Gatenby and P. Maini. Cancer summed up. Nature, 421:321, January 2003.
6. D. Hanahan and R. Weinberg. The hallmarks of cancer. Cell, 100:57–70, Jan.
2000.
7. W. C. Hahn and R. Weinberg. Rules for making human tumor cells. N Engl J
Med, 347(20):1593–1603, Nov. 2002.
8. J. von Neumann and O. Morgernstern. Theory of games and economic behaviour.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953.
9. M. Nowak. Evolutionary dynamics. Belknap, 2006.
10. Michael Merston-Gibbons. An introduction to game-theoretic modelling. AMS,
2 edition, 2000.
11. J. Maynard Smith. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1982.
12. R. A. Fisher. The genetical theory of natural selection. Clarendon, 1930.
13. J. Maynard Smith and D. Harper. Animal signals. OUP, 2003.
14. I.P.M. Tomlinson and W. F. Bodmer. Modelling the consequences of interactions
between tumour cells. Brit. J. Cancer, 75(2):157–60, 1997.
15. I.P.M. Tomlinson. Game theory models of interactions between tumour cells.
Eur. J. Cancer, Vol 33, N9, pp. 1495-1500, 1997.
16. R. Gatenby and T. Vincent. An evolutionary model of carcinogenesis. Cancer
Res., 63:6212–6220, October 2003.
17. O. Warburg. The metabolism of tumors (English translation by F. Dickens).
London: Constable, 1930.
18. Robert A. Gatenby and Edward T. Gawlinski. The glycolytic phenotype in
carcinogenesis and tumor invasion. Cancer Res. 63, 3847-3854, July 15, 2003,
2003.
19. R. Gatenby and R. J.. Gillies. Why do cancers have high aerobic glycolysis?
Nat. Rev. Cancer, 4:891–899, 2004.
20. R. Gatenby, E. Gawlinski, A. Gmitro, B. Kaylor, and R. Gillies. Acid-mediated
tumor invasion: a multidisciplinary study. Cancer Res., 66(10):5216–23, May
2006.
21. J. Folkman. The role of angiogenesis in tumor growth. Semin. Cancer Biol.,
3:65–71, 1992.
22. L.A. Bach, S. M. Bentzen, J. Alsner, and F. B. Christiansen. An evolutionary
game model of tumour cell interactions: possible relevance to gene therapy. Eur.
Jour. Cancer, 37:2116–2120, 2001.
23. L.A. Bach, D. J. T.. Sumpter, J. Alsner, and V. Loeschke. Spatial evolutionary
games of interaction among generic cancer cells. Jour. Theo. Med., 5(1):47–58,
2003.
24. M. Nowak and R. May. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature,
18(359):826–29, 1992.
25. Y. Mansury and T. Deisboeck. the impact of ’search-precision’ in an agent based
tumor model. Jour. Theo. Biol., 224:325–337, 2003.
16 David Basanta*, Andreas Deutsch
26. Y. Mansury, M. Diggory, and T. S. Deisboeck. Evolutionary game theory in an
agent based brain tumor model: exploring the genoype phenotype link. Jour.
Theo. Biol., 238:146–156, 2006.
27. D. Basanta, M. Simon, H. Hatzikirou, and A. Deutsch. An evolutionary game
theory perspective elucidates the role of glycolysis in tumour invasion. Submit-
ted, June 2007.
28. F. Hoppensteadt. Mathematical methods of population biology. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1982.
29. T. Vincent. Carcinogenesis as an evolutionary game. Adv. in compl. sys.,
9(4):369–382, 2006.
30. T. Vincent and R. Gatenby. Somatic evolution of cancer. Int. Game Th. Rev.,
9(4), 2007.
31. R. Axelrod and W. Hamilton. The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211:1390–
1396, 1981.
32. R. Axelrod, D. Axelrod, and K. Pienta. Evolution of cooperation among tumor
cells. PNAS, 103(36):13474–79, Sept. 2006.
33. C. Park, M. Bissell, and M. Barcellos-Hoff. The influence of the microenviron-
ment on the malignant phenotype. Mol. Med. Today, 6:324–329, August 2000.
